Air Force commanders at every level are accountable for the actions, successes, and failures of their command and those under their command; it is the most underappreciated aspect of command. This paper examines two senior officer accountability events: the 2007 MinotBarksdale AFB nuclear incident in which six nuclear weapons were transported with neither authorization nor knowledge of the Airmen involved and the 1994 B-52 crash at Fairchild AFB.
Introduction
"I assume command." With three solemn words, two weighty realities follow. First, the full force of, and responsibility to, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is imposed on the new commander. Second, the full weight of accountability for the actions, successes, and failures of the unit is placed squarely on the shoulders of the incoming commander.
Senior Air Force officers have been relieved of command and/or held accountable seemingly ad hoc. This paper examines two senior officer accountability events. In each, senior commanders were held accountable for actions of those under their command. The first is the Minot-Barksdale nuclear incident. In August 2007, six nuclear weapons not authorized for removal from storage or transport, were loaded on a B-52 and flown across North America. Two squadron commanders, two group commanders, and a wing commander were relieved. A year later, the Air Force Chief of Staff (CSAF) and Secretary were forced to retire, yet both the 8th Air Force and Air Combat Command (ACC) commanders emerged apparently unscathed.
The second is the 1994 Fairchild AFB B-52 crash which killed four aircrew. The squadron commander was unable to influence his commanders to ground an unsafe pilot and consequently vowed he would always fly with the rouge pilot to protect his crews; perishing in the accident, he paid the ultimate price of accountability. In the aftermath, the group commander was court-martialed and subsequently retired. The wing commander testified at the court-martial in exchange for immunity from prosecution. conclusions that speak to long-term degradation of discipline and adherence to established procedures…these conclusions seem at odds with each other." 12 If you had asked me about the nuke mission prior to the incident I would have told you the mission would go away for Barksdale within a year…the wing exercises were mere shadows of those in the '90s. The wing commander told me the mission was not going away, but that we would not be required to maintain the same proficiency. I thought if we ever tried to put guys back on alert, it would take months or years to regain the old level of competence. Even then, I was stunned at the actions leading to the transfer.
The BRR and DSB reports also agreed with the base-level root cause errors, but determined the systemic issue was not isolated, but a "declining focus on the strategic nuclear bomber mission" 13 and the bomber force had become "overwhelmingly conventional operations focused" 14 due to atrophy of the larger nuclear mission in the Air Force. 15 This decline seems to have begun with "the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union" 16 evidenced by the bomber units last practicing nuclear alert in September 1992. 17 B-52 crews estimate "5-20%
of their time [was] spent on the nuclear mission." 18 General Welch's team acknowledged the Airmen's tactical-level errors but "found this change in the level of focus on the nuclear enterprise to be DoD-wide." 19 In the Air Force specifically, the DSB reported "ICBM forces remain tightly focused on their mission," 20 implying the issue was largely resident in the now nuclear/conventional-integrated B-52 community. The declining focus was part of a larger list of issues.
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These do not seem like "unit level" issues but rather senior leader issues -at the most senior levels. General Welch agrees: "…if you search…for statements from the senior leadership emphasizing the importance of the strategic nuclear mission…you will search in vain." 22 So the question of accountability is raised. Who bears this cross? In the end, for the "most egregious breach of nuclear procedures" 23 in history, the highest-ranking officer held accountable was the wing commander -a colonel.
Accountability
Secretary Gates fired senior Army officers following disclosures of poor services to wounded veterans and "pushed into retirement…generals closely associated with a faltering strategy in Iraq." 24 So it is little wonder the DoD IG oversight team asked, "Did the Air
Force…reasonably assign accountability?" 25 According to an unnamed senior official, the excuse and reason officers are relieved sometimes differ. 31 The excuse was Secretary Gates' "decision to seek their resignations 'based entirely' on the Admiral Donald report which uncovered a 'gradual erosion of nuclear standards and a lack of effective oversight by Air Force leadership, '" 32 and "a pattern of poor performance" w/ nuclear military components. 33 The reason was "The SECDEF didn't trust 
Not Relieved
In 2007, all B-52 aircraft were assigned to ACC through 8th Air Force. (Fig. 1 43 This may have been the reason no action was taken against him. But does not the greatest breach of nuclear procedures in history merit some general officer accountability? After all, General Moseley was "admonished" 44 after his retirement for less serious, and unproven, allegations. † Lieutenant General Elder, 8th AF/CC, and the first general officer in the chain of command, was not relieved. However, the DoD IG noted, "any potential accountability for the incident at 8th AF headquarters was limited from the inception of the tactical ferry missions, as that organization was not an action addressee on the ACC Repositioning Order." 45 Wheeler was retained because his Barksdale team caught the error, appropriately handled the situation, and quickly up-channeled to senior leadership. 48 As of this writing, Wheeler continues to serve on active duty as a major general (select).
During research for this paper, the author learned a new term: skip-echelon. In essence, † General T. Michael Moseley was issued a Letter of Admonishment 3 months after his retirement for the appearance of impropriety. His public rebuttal expressed frustration with "factual inaccuracies" in the investigation which resulted in "flawed and biased" conclusions. 
Conclusion
Accountability in the Minot-Barksdale nuclear incident was far-reaching and enduring -65 Airmen were relieved of command, removed from their positions of responsibility, or decertified in the nuclear mission, but none higher than the wing-level.
To their credit, "neither wing commander gave any indication accountability for the incident went above the wing level." 52 The findings of three separate and independent investigations clearly indicate the larger issue of nuclear "erosion" -a storm which had been brewing for more than 15 years -rests fully on the shoulders of the highest levels of Air Force 
Outcome
This case has been studied perhaps more than any other for safety and accountability. In the three years prior to the accident, these seven highly visible incidents went almost completely ignored; wing aircrew began to take matters into their own hands. Following a under any circumstance, even if ordered. 59 McGeehan confronted Holland and brought his concerns to his boss Colonel Pellerin, who listened to both sides of the story and issued Holland an (undocumented) verbal reprimand, but did not ground him as McGeehan had requested.
Accountability 325th Bomber Squadron Commander
As a squadron commander, McGeehan's first disciplinary encounter with Holland's reckless flying was the Yakima Bomb Range incident in which Holland "nearly crashed a B-52 …by flying too low over a ridge, and demanded Holland be grounded." 60 He lived up to his word and paid the ultimate price of accountability.
92nd Operations Group Commander
On 17 June 1994, Colonel Pellerin flew with Holland during an airshow practice as a safety observer. He reported to Colonel Brooks, "…everything looks well in parameters, limitations, and looks good." 63 But Brooks knew that was inaccurate. He had been outdoors during part of the flight and verbally said, "this was not supposed to be happening… [Holland] was too low and banking over too hard." 64 But no one took action.
Senior Fairchild officers ignoring, and even encouraging, rogue flying had become acceptable. Several years prior, during a two-ship low level flight across the desert, Holland flew his jet so low it kicked up a rooster tail of dust. The vice wing commander was in the other B-52. 65 When he saw it, he encouraged his junior pilot to descend and do the same. But none of these officers received any disciplinary action for these events or their lack of intervention. 68 The buck stopped at Colonel Pellerin.
Following the crash, the 12th Air Force Commander, Lieutenant General Thomas
Griffith, ** court-martialed Pellerin charging him with "three counts of dereliction of duty: failure to obtain proper approval for the airshow maneuvers, failure to ensure a safe routine, and failure to ground Holland after repeated violations of Air Force safety regulations." 69 In testimony, he admitted "inexcusably poor judgment," that he should have done more to correct Holland's history of dangerous flying, 70 and accepted "full responsibility for not having prevented this…it was my duty to do so." 71 In exchange for reduced sentencing, Colonel Pellerin pleaded guilty to two counts of dereliction of duty. Reprimand (LOR) the details of which have not been publicly released. 77 In stark contrast to accepting accountability, Brooks instead accepted immunity from prosecution in exchange for his testimony at Pellerin's court-martial. 78 Colonel Brooks retired in April 1995 with full benefits 79 having not pinned on his Senate confirmed star 80 as a result of administrative actions following the 1994 Fairchild AFB crash. Colonel Pellerin apparently struggled to summon the necessary leadership skills to ground Holland. However, in the end, Pellerin accepted full responsibility for his inaction and demonstrated a willingness to be held accountable through a guilty plea at his court-martial.
Pellerin lost a future wing command and promising AF career. 82 Yet, one wonders why Lieutenant General Griffiths did not also recommend Colonel Brooks, the veritable "captain of the ship," for court-martial.
Colonel Brooks' willingness to accept immunity from prosecution in exchange for his testimony flies in the face of Pellerin and McGeehan. As the wing commander, he was obligated to provide factual information regarding his wing upon request, and not under the promise of immunity from prosecution. AF leadership disciplined Brooks with an LOR, withdrew his promotion to brigadier general, and withheld a third wing command opportunity. But his testimony against a former commander, to save himself, seems to tarnish his career and character more than does his truncated career.
The U.S. Air Force has shot down its own credibility... the Air Force let Brooks escape accountability."

Information Synthesis & Policy Recommendations Analysis
Commanders and senior officers are relieved for essentially three reasons. The first is UCMJ infractions that result in formal discipline. It is important at this point to distinguish between accountability and discipline. As a subset of accountability, discipline is meted out for events in which the commander has personally done, or is complicit in, wrong-doing.
A second reason is the "loss of confidence in the leadership/command ability." This catchall is the most ambiguous and perhaps the most important tool in the senior commander's accountability toolbox. It is here we find the most underappreciated aspect of command -the senior officer in command is accountable for mission failures and misconduct of those under his command. To a higher standard, "we hold ourselves accountable to the American people." 83 As a senior DoD official noted, the more serious (and public) the issue, the more likely this will be invoked; the government must demonstrate the willingness to hold senior officials accountable as a tool for appeasing the demand for accountability and to "stop it as fast as possible." 84 It is for this reason the word scapegoat rises to the surface. If the issue is serious enough, it may cross an imaginary and inconsistent line in the political sand resulting in the third reason.
Some issues are so serious, political, and public, "Washington demands a senior officer be fired." 85 In the USAF, a senior officer is a colonel (O-6) and above. In Washington, however, senior officer is code for general officer. The number of USAF general officers is relatively small and statutorily limited. In the Air Force, no more than 43 officers may serve in 86 Producing new generals takes time -especially three-and four-stars.
Therefore, firing a general officer is "usually intended to protect the real high ups" 87 by limiting accountability to the lowest general rank possible.
Norms of Accountability
In peacetime, the captain of a Navy ship which runs aground or collides with another ship can expect to be relieved dockside upon return. Virtually nothing he can say will change this outcome. 88 Similarly, a court-martial is all but automatic for a soldier or marine who loses his weapon. 89 But such standardized conventions in accountability are rare -and this is good;
relieving a commander or senior leader is a serious matter. Time, investigation, and deliberation must be given their due. A consequence, however, is the impression of an ad hoc process.
Accountability Avoided?
Incomplete publicly available information raises the question, "Did two commanders, Lieutenant General Elder, 8th AF/CC and Colonel Brooks, 92nd BW/CC deliberately avoid accountability?" The answer is likely "no."
In the Minot-Barksdale nuclear incident, Lieutenant General Elder avoided all consequences. In testimony and personal discussions with AWC personnel in 2007, Elder stated skip-echelon was the only thing that saved him from being relieved. With no further explanation, one runs the risk of misevaluating this statement and inferring Lieutenant General
Elder intentionally "hid behind skip-echelon to save his own butt." 90 Though at first it seems counter-intuitive a NAF commander would be outside the operational lines of command, his commanders agreed skip-echelon protected him from accountability. Given the odd command relationship, the AF probably got this one right; an Airman was not wrongly held accountable.
In response to the erosion of the nuclear enterprise, the Air Force created Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) on 7 Aug 2009. 91 Also, 8th Air Force was restored to its former WWII glory as a combatant NAF responsible for operations, training, and maintenanceno more skip-echelon. 92 A search of the public record did not reveal Colonel Brooks was held to account following the 1994 B-52 crash at Fairchild. Though some websites did allude to his withheld promotion to brigadier general and withdrawn assignment to a third wing command, the vast majority of the public splash revolved around the deaths and Colonel Pellerin's court-martial.
Court testimony, which is not in the public record and must be requested from AF/JA, demonstrate Brooks was indeed held accountable for his complicity in the event. But, once again, the lack of correct and complete information results in skewed perceptions. 
Policy Recommendations
Every situation is unique. Accountability is situation dependent and, to a large measure, subjective. These complexities are the very elements which require thinking officers, commanders, and senior civilian leadership to attend to all the necessary facts and expeditiously conclude accountability actions against commanders and senior officers. Through investigation into these case studies, it appears the Air Force gets senior leader accountability right much of the time. Any delay or incomplete information, however, results in the appearance of inconsistently applied standards of accountability at best, 93 and cover-up at worst.
AFIs require wings hold quarterly Status of Discipline (SOD) meetings. Wing commanders
generally use these as instructional opportunities for subordinate commanders to openly discuss the nature of discipline to specific infractions. However, SODs are almost entirely devoid of officer discipline. If they do, rarely is discipline discussed of officers more senior than lieutenants. Furthermore, at PME and commander's courses, officers receive little more than commentary on AF core values when instructed on accountability and receive no formal training in discipline.
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Recommendation. Add specific training and education to IDE/SDE and commander's courses using real-world historical examples. Do not develop an "accountability AFI." Commanders need the flexibility to evaluate details and take actions without the limitations of yet another AFI.
The JA is available to navigate the specifics of the law.
2.
Institutional transparency versus privacy is a delicate balance. However, the lack of forthright public release results in inaccurate information dominating public discourse. The DoD releases daily public statements. In the research for this paper, the author found press-briefing transcripts from the Minot-Barksdale nuclear incident. However, information was deliberately redacted to protect the privacy of individuals. The result is the appearance of cover-up. By not openly addressing this issue, misinformation dominates the public media.
Recommendation. Continue to protect the privacy of individuals however release the specifics of actions taken. A page of information detailing the position, rank, action taken, and the reason for stated action would be sufficient. Provide details why measures did not go further up the chain and why general officers were not held accountable.
3. According to AFIs, skip-echelon advises manpower, not command authority.
Recommendation. Ensure operational chain of command never skips echelons. Airmen and US citizens have the right to expect continuity of command from flight to CSAF. Skip-echelon, as interpreted in the Minot-Barksdale situation, undermines command authority and leads to the impression general officers are held to a different standard, if at all.
Conclusion
"Every high profile incident…is different." However, failure to "adequately define, explain or uniformly apply accountability standards" continues to fuel the perception accountability is inconsistent and ad hoc. "When one has access to all the facts, it is clear Air Force senior leaders are attempting to [consistently apply accountability standards]…but most AF members [don't have access to the facts and] rely on the Air Force Times" for information. 95 Implementing these recommendations would significantly improve understanding of accountability and discipline in the officer corps and ensure public confidence in DoD accountability transparency.
